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Abstract
Transgender rights are a highly contested issue, upsetting the ‘normal’ ordering of society. In Europe, transgender persons
continue to suffer discrimination and harassment, and their rights are contested time and again. Eventually they can turn
to the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in Strasbourg. In such politically sensitive matters, how do judges in
Strasbourg decide? Do they set European norms bolstering transgender rights, or do they refrain from interference in state
affairs? Testing expectations based on rational and sociological institutionalism, this article analyses all 33 Court cases on
transgender issues since 1980. As a judge’s low score on trans rights in their home country does not mean that they vote
against trans rights, and as judges do no defend their home country but vote with the ‘pro-state’ or ‘pro-trans’ majority,
rationalist expectations were not confirmed. Sociological institutionalist processes of widening and narrowing tell us more
about the hesitant and uneven strengthening of transgender rights, if within the limits of binary thinking as regards the
transgender body, marriage and family.
Keywords
European Court of Human Rights; gender identity; human rights; transgender
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Trans* Politics: Current Challenges and Contestations,” edited by Mieke Verloo (Radboud
University, the Netherlands) and Anna van der Vleuten (Radboud University, the Netherlands).
© 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Time and again, transgender rights are contested.
Carried by a wave of radical right populism, conservative
nationalism and religious fundamentalism, hate speech
against, and discrimination of, transgender people are
perceived to once again be on the increase in Europe
(ILGA-Europe, 2020, p. 7). When they are slighted by
a state, transgender people can turn to Strasbourg’s
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the Court),
which enforces the human rights codified in the 1950
European Convention for the Protection of HumanRights
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter the Convention).
All 47 of the current member states of the Council of
Europe have adopted the Convention. Although it does
not mention transgender rights specifically, some ar-
ticles clearly are relevant, such as respect for private
and family life (Article 8). Since its inception in 1959,
the Court has delivered over 21,600 judgments, and
in 84 percent it found at least one violation of the
Convention (European Court of Human Rights, 2019,
p. 3). While this high percentage of judgments criticising
state behaviour sounds hopeful for people whose rights
have been violated, the balance is far less favourable in
transgender cases. In 33 judgments, the Court found vio-
lations in only 39 percent (calculation based on HUDOC,
n.d.; see Tables 1 and 2 for details).
Given continuing contestations of trans rights, do the
Court’s judges set European norms bolstering transgen-
der rights, or do they defend state sovereignty in such
politically sensitive matters? This question is the focus
of this article. Former president of the Court Wildhaber
warned that: “If we are perceived as catering too much
to the government, scholars and practitioners will criti-
cise us” (as cited in Bruinsma& Parmentier, 2003, p. 186).
High-ranked politicians in several countries, including
TheNetherlands, Poland, Russia, Turkey and theUK, have
complained that the Court promotes ‘alien’ European
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norms without due consideration for national specifici-
ties (Amos, 2017; Mälksoo, 2016; Oomen, 2016; Swirc,
2017). Yet former judge Tulkens is quoted deploring that:
“The raison d’état is more present here than I would have
thought possible” (Bruinsma, 2006, p. 41). Contestations
hence pit national sovereignty and judicial autonomy
against each other. In legal terms, this question regards
the balance between judicial restraint (inter alia, judges
confirming a government’s margin of appreciation) and
judicial activism (judges widening interpretations to bol-
ster political and societal change; de Waele & van der
Vleuten, 2011).
As a political scientist, I frame the question as a puz-
zle involving rational and sociological institutionalism:
To what extent do judges defend national norms and, in-
directly, state interests, and to what extent do they act
as European norm setters? Scholars disagree (see Amos,
2017). Some argue that opinions converge to a European
norm in the Court (Arold, 2007a, 2007b), confirming
sociological institutionalist expectations (Checkel, 2005).
Others expect judges to cast their votes strategically, de-
pending on perceived state interests (Garrett, Keleman,
& Schulz, 1998). Clearing up this argument is the aca-
demic contribution this article aims to make. In addition,
it presents the first analysis of all transgender cases de-
cided by the Court between 1980 and 2020 from a po-
litical science perspective. The following section elabo-
rates the institutionalist approaches. Next, I present the
methodology. The empirical part presents the data con-
cerning the judgments and judges involved.
2. Theoretical Framework
The Court has been praised as ‘the crown jewel’ of the
international system for the protection of civil and polit-
ical liberties (Helfer, 2008, p. 159). It has been studied
by political scientists, who have focussed inter alia on
the politics of judicial appointments (Voeten, 2008) and
patterns of (non-)compliance by member states (Panke,
2020). Building on their work, this article explores to
what extent judges bolster political and societal progress
concerning transgender rights. I use two institutionalist
approaches which explain outcomes as constrained and
enabled by formal and informal institution: rationalist
and sociological institutionalism.
Rationalist institutionalism assumes that actors,
whether judges or governments, will act based on an as-
sessment of their interests (Garrett et al., 1998). Their
behaviour can hence be understood as guided by strate-
gic calculations, in the sense of an assessment of what
would strengthen or weaken their position materially
and ideationally (see van der Vleuten, 2005). In that light,
judicial behaviour can be explained based on judges’
strategic interest. As ‘agents’ simultaneously embedded
in a domestic and a European context, they will aim to
avoid tensions with their ‘principal,’ i.e., the government
that nominated them. Governments will prefer the sta-
tus quo on transgender rights over costly changes to
their legislation, unless societal mobilisation is such that
the status quo becomes too costly and thus unattractive
(van der Vleuten, 2005). Transgender norms are salient
enough to engender high political and societal ‘costs,’
because they touch upon core state issues as marriage,
family and the basic ordering of society into two stable
categories of man and woman. In the rationalist view,
judges will take into account their government’s prefer-
ences and grant it a large margin of appreciation, be-
cause the Court’s legitimacy depends on the member
states accepting its decisions. In sum, rational institution-
alism expects that: 1) Judges from countries where trans-
gender rights are relatively poorly developed will sup-
port a narrow interpretation of European human rights,
even more so when their home country is concerned;
and 2) judges from countries where transgender rights
are relatively well-developed will support a broad inter-
pretation of European human rights.
Sociological institutionalism takes a different ap-
proach, not based on an individualist logic of conse-
quences but on a logic of appropriateness. This logic de-
parts from the understanding that individuals base their
behaviour on an interpretation of their environment,
and its written and unwritten rules. Sociological institu-
tionalism sees European institutions as sites of sociali-
sation, “insulated settings where social pressure [by the
‘principal’] is absent or deflected” (Checkel, 2005, p. 806).
This would enable actors to learn new, European norms
that differ from the ones ‘at home.’
Checkel (2005) identifies different mechanisms that
induce agents to adopt new norms: “The key is the
agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given set-
ting or community” (p. 804). Agents will then behave ac-
cordingly because of so-called social sanctioning, a cer-
tain coercion to conform to the group in order to avoid
being shamed. Some scholars argue that this peer pres-
sure results in a trend “of unanimity and thereby homo-
geneity, which then proposes a claim towards European
convergence” (Arold, 2007a, p. 320). In this view, judges
do not want to be lone dissenters in the Court’s ‘splendid
isolation’ in Strasbourg (Voeten, 2008). In a perfect de-
piction of a social-sanctioningmechanism, Judge Rozakis
describes his own experience as follows:
Judges feel themselves assessed by their colleagues,
they create their self-image in the eyes of their col-
leagues, and they run the risk of losing their re-
spectability in their immediate environment if they
pay too much attention to the interests of their home
country. (As cited in Bruinsma, 2008, p. 38)
Another mechanism is social learning (Checkel, 2005,
p. 812), when agents actively accept community norms
as ‘the right thing to do’ and are willing to reshape their
interests based on new arguments learned through de-
liberations and persuasion. When concepts and rights
contained in the European Convention are reinterpreted
in these deliberations in order to cover new issues,
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such as the position of transgender persons, this can
amount to ‘widening’ interpretations. The Court prides
itself on its ‘living instrument approach’ (Amos, 2017,
p. 21), which expresses the principle that the Convention
is interpreted in the light of present-day conditions,
and that it evolves through the interpretations of the
Court. Sociological institutionalism hence expects that
induced by social sanctioning and/or social learning,
judges will articulate a broad interpretation of European
trans rights.
Before turning to the methodological section, I will
briefly present the institutional setting of the Court.
The Court evaluates complaints by individuals against
their government they deem in violation of the 1950
Convention or one of its protocols. Since 1998, all citizens
of Council of Europe member states can appeal directly
to the Court when they have no domestic legal reme-
dies left. Cases are taken by a Chamber of three to seven
judges, including the judge from the country involved in
the case. Used in controversial or important cases, the
Grand Chamber numbers 17 judges or more, including
the national judge. The other judges are appointed by
lot (European Court of Human Rights, 2020, Chapter V).
The principle of national representation is enshrined
in the rules of the Court in different ways (European
Court of Human Rights, 2020). Every member state of
the Council of Europe is entitled to have one judge. It pro-
poses three candidates, and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe elects the judge from this
list. Judges serve nine years. Procedurally, the ‘national
judge’ plays a specific role because they act as gate-
keeper for cases that concern their country. As rappor-
teur they make a recommendation on the admissibility
of this case to a committee of three judges. If the rappor-
teur suggests dismissing the case and the other judges
on the committee support the rapporteur, the case is
dismissed without a decision on its merits. In the sec-
ond stage, the ‘national judge’ is always included in the
Chamber which decides the case.
3. Methodology
A search of the Court’s database, HUDOC, resulted in
44 cases concerning transgender rights, of which 11 are
still pending (last checked July 18, 2020). This leaves
33 cases for analysis. Transgender cases predominately
concern alleged violations of a small number of arti-
cles from the Convention, particularly Article 8 on the
right to respect for private and family life, Article 12
on the right to marry, and Article 14 on the prohibition
of discrimination.
Rationalist expectations were checked by assess-
ing the situation for transgender persons in all mem-
ber states over time. For the period between 2011
and 2020, I used information from the annual Rainbow
Europe Country Index compiled by ILGA Europe, a
non-governmental organisation which promotes equal-
ity and human rights for LGBTI people (ILGA-Europe,
2011−2020). The Rainbow index’ country scores could
not be used, however, as they have been calculated dif-
ferently over the years, the indicators are weighed based
on changing and perhaps political considerations, and
they cover lesbian, gay and intersex rights as well. I have
therefore selected 14 indicators from the index which re-
fer to legal standards regarding transgender people: is
persecution because of gender identity recognised in asy-
lum law; are hate speech and violence against transgen-
der people recognised in criminal law; does discrimina-
tion law address gender identity; can transgender peo-
ple legally marry a person of the other gender; is there
a procedure for legal gender recognition, and which con-
ditions apply (divorce, medical mental diagnosis, surgery,
sterilisation). For each indicator, I scored 0 (legislation ab-
sent at national level) or 1 (legislation present at national
level), resulting in annual scores per country between 0
and 14.
Of course, legislation does not fully capture daily
life in a country, but it does offer a relatively straight-
forward yardstick. Rational institutionalism would ex-
pect judges from low-scoring countries to deliver nar-
row, status-quo judgements, while judges from high-
scoring countries would deliver pro-transgender judge-
ments. Unfortunately, a similar calculation is not possible
for years before 2011. The pioneering report by Whittle,
Turner, Combs, and Rhodes (2008) has too many ‘un-
knowns’ and does not cover all countries involved. Other
excellent overviews (Hammarberg, 2009; Van den Brink
& Dunne, 2018) discuss the legal situation in countries at
a given point in time. For the early years, therefore, I can
only offer some examples.
Sociological institutionalist expectations were tested
by analysing the separate opinions attached to Court
decisions. Separate opinions present the arguments of
judges who, in a concurring opinion, give an additional
explanation on their vote, while in a dissenting opin-
ion they explain why they disagree with the majority.
All opinions were checked for instances of persuasion,
widening and narrowing.
4. Transgender Cases before the Court
In 1976, Belgian lawyer Daniel van Oosterwijck, called
Danielle at birth, lodged the first transgender case with
the Court. He wanted to change the gender status in
his birth certificate, but Belgian law had no provision
to do so. The Court declared his request inadmissi-
ble, because he had not exhausted domestic remedies
(Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 1976, p. 14). Nine years
later, Mark Rees (Brenda at birth) submitted a similar re-
quest. The Court found no violation of his right to respect
for private life (Article 8 of the Convention). Although
Rees lost his case, his action in Strasbourg resulted in am-
ple media attention and the birth of a trans rights ad-
vocacy group, Press for Change. Rees v. the UK (1986)
also sparked a political campaign by UK Member of
Parliament Alex Carlile, which would eventually result in
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the UK’s Gender Recognition Act in 2004 (Rees, 2009).
Only in 2002 would the Court stop defending the British
government’s position (Goodwin v. UK, 2002).
Over the years, there are some recurring themes in
the cases brought before the Court (see Tables 1 and 2),
the most prominent one being legal gender recognition.
Initially—as in Rees’ case—cases concerned the sheer
possibility to have one’s birth certificate modified. Later
cases concern the conditions set to qualify for gender
recognition, most notably the obligations to divorce, to
undergo genital surgery and to be permanently ster-
ilised. Other cases regard marriage and parental rights.
A last theme is sexual harassment and degrading treat-
ment suffered by transgender sex workers. In 13 cases,
transgender applicants won their case, while in 14 cases
they lost it. No clear trend is shown over time, as won
and lost cases alternate. The next section first examines
whether annual country scores correlate with judges’
voting behaviour in the Court, then studying how the “na-
tional judge” votes and tracing socialisation processes in
the Court.
4.1. Conservative Countries, Conservative Judges?
National legislation and societal attitudes regarding trans-
gender people continue to vary strongly between mem-
ber states (Transgender Europe, 2019). The judges’ voting
behaviour might reflect these differences. Table 1 shows
all 17 transgender cases until 2010 plus the votes cast
(listed according to the judges’ nationality instead of us-
ing their names). A vote aligned with transgender contes-
tation is noted as ‘trans,’ a vote alignedwith state policies
is noted as ‘state.’ As noted above, I have no data to score
the state of transgender rights in a country before 2011.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that there might
be no correlation between national transgender rights
and the voting behaviour of judges. In Rees v. UK (1986),
for instance, the three judges voting in favour of legal gen-
der recognition against themajority came from a forerun-
ner (Denmark) and two laggards (Italy and Switzerland).
In XYZ v. the UK (1997), minority votes arguing that trans
rights were being violated came not only from forerunner
Denmark but also from laggards Andorra, Bulgaria and
Poland. And although Germany introduced legal gender
recognition in 1980, German judges voted against a viola-
tion of trans rights in many cases.
For later years, the data allows for calculating the
yearly scores of individual countries as regards the sit-
uation of transgender rights (see Section 3). Table 2
presents all cases between 2011–2020, with coun-
try scores.
For these cases, we found a slightly higher average
country score (5.43) for judges who voted in favour of
transgender rights than for judges who voted in defence
of the state (5.03; Table 2), which is in line with rational-
institutionalist expectations. Also, in all cases withminor-
ity votes, the average country score for ‘pro-trans’ vot-
ers is higher than for ‘pro-state’ voters, for instance in
Hämäläinen v. Finland (2014) and X v. FYROM (2019).
That said, the number of cases is very limited. Evenmore
troubling for any firm conclusion are the highly diverg-
ing scores at the individual level, where judges from high-
scoring countries (Estonia, France, Portugal) vote ‘no vio-
lation,’ and judges from low-scoring countries (Armenia,
Macedonia, San Marino) vote in defence of trans rights.
I conclude that judges seem to vote independently, as
their national situation regarding transgender rights can-
not explain their voting behaviour.
4.2. My Government, My Vote?
Howdo judges behavewhen their own government is un-
der scrutiny? In his quantitative analysis of 7,319 Court
cases, Erik Voeten found that “national bias does mat-
ter and appears to be greater on politically sensitive is-
sues” (2008, p. 418). When a ruling favours the appli-
cant’s country, the judge from that country more often
votes with the majority than other judges; and when a
ruling goes against ‘their’ country, they dissent more of-
ten (Voeten, 2008, p. 425). Voeten found that career in-
centives play a role, but also that “judges are subject to
increased pressure on controversial cases that directly
deal with the security of a country” (2008, p. 428).
For transgender cases, my findings are different.
Tables 1 and 2 show how national judges voted, sum-
marised by Table 3. In 14 cases of 27, national judges
voted in defence of their home government with the
majority in a state-supporting outcome. Sometimes they
did so while hesitating. In Sheffield and Horsham v. UK
(1998) for instance, a pro-state case with a narrow ma-
jority of 11–9, national judge Freeland admitted that he
cast his vote defending the British state “after much hesi-
tation and even with some reluctance,” because “contin-
ued inaction on the part of the respondent State, taken
together with further developments elsewhere, could
well tilt the balance in the other direction” (Sheffield and
Horsham v. UK, 1998, p. 25). In another case, national
judge Ganshof van der Meersch voted with the majority
defending the Belgian state, but his ‘partially concurring
opinion’ reveals his doubts; he disagrees with the argu-
ment of the majority that the applicant should have ap-
pealed in cassation first, as the appeal clearly would be
‘doomed to fail’ (VanOosterwijck v. Belgium, 1976, p. 19).
In a single case, B v. France (1992), the national judge
staunchly defended his government against the decision
of a large “pro-trans” majority.
In the 12 other cases, the national judge voted with
the majority in a transgender-rights supporting outcome
against their government (Table 3). This was also the
case in two recent cases, when national judges voted
with the majority in favour of legal gender recognition
(YT v. Bulgaria, 2020) and legal gender recognition of
migrants (Rana v. Hungary, 2020). This is all the more
striking because of the political situation in these coun-
tries. The Bulgarian government has decided against rat-
ifying the Istanbul Convention of the Council of Europe
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Table 1. Cases concerning transgender issues including voting behaviour, 1980–2010.
Nationality of judges Nationality of judges
Case #, Vote voting aligned with voting aligned with
Case Topic Year decision and result state policies trans contestation
Van Oosterwijck Legal 7654/76, 13–4 inadm. Be*-Cy-F-Ice-Ire-It-Mlt- Au-Gr-Lux-Tk
v. Belgium recognition 1980 state NL-No-Port-Sp-Swe-UK
Rees v. UK Legal 9532/81, 12–3 state Au, Fr, Ger, Ice, Ire, Lux, NL, Dk, It, Swi
recognition 1986 No, Port, Swe, Tur, UK*
Cossey v. UK Marriage 10843/84, 10–8 state Au, Fr, Ger, Ice, Ire, Mlt, Dk, Fin, It, Lcht, Lux, NL,
1990 No, Sp, Tur, UK* Swe, Swi
B v. France Marriage 13343/87, 15–6 trans Au, Cy, Fr*, Gr, Port, Sp Fin, Ger, Hu, Ice, Ire, It,
1992 Lcht, Lux, Mlt, NL, San M,
Swe, Swi, Tur, UK
XYZ v. UK Family 21830/93, 14–6 state Au, Bel, Cz, Est, Fr, Ger, Gr, And, Bul, Dk, Ice, It, Po
1997 Hu, Lat, Lit, Lux, No, Port,
UK*
Sheffield and Legal 22985/93, 11–9 state Au, Bel, Cy, Cz, Gr, Lit, And, Ger, Ice, Lux, NL,
Horsham v. UK recognition 1998 Mol, Port, Sp, Ukr, UK* Po, Ro, Swe, Swi
Goodwin v. UK Legal 28957/95, 17–0 trans Alb, Bel, Cro, Cz, Fr, Geo,
recognition 2002 Hu, Ire, Lcht, Lux, No,
San M, Swe, Swi, Tur,
Ukr, UK*
I v. UK Legal 25680/94, 17–0 trans [same as Goodwin]
recognition 2002
Van Kück v. Surgery 35968/97, 4–3 trans Ire, No, Port Ger*, Slove, Swi, Tur
Germany 2003
Grant v. UK Legal 32570/03, 7–0 trans Alb, And, B&H, Fin, Mlt,
recognition 2006 Slovk, UK*
Parry v. UK Marriage 42971/05, 7–0 state And, B&H, Fin, Mold, Po,
2006 Slovk, UK*
R and F v. UK Marriage 35748/05, 7–0 state Alb, And, B&H, Mlt, Mold,
2006 Po, UK*
L v. Lithuania Surgery 27527/03, 6–1 trans Swe Fr, Geor, Hu, Lit*, Serb,
2007 Tur
Guerrero Castillo Legal 39432/06, 7–0 inadm. Be-Geo-Hu-It*-Port-SanM-
v. Italy recognition 2007 state Tur
Nunez v. France Legal 18367/06, 7–0 inadm. Cz-Dk-Fr*-Ger-Mac-Mo-Ukr
recognition 2008 state
Schlumpf v. Medical 29002/06, 5–2 trans Cro, No Azer, Cy, Gr, Lux, Swi*
Switzerland costs 2009
P.V. v. Spain Family 35159/09, 7–0 state And, Arm, NL, Ro, Slove,
2010 Sp*, Swe
Notes: * National judges.
to combat violence against women, inter alia because
it believes that would increase the likelihood of young
people identifying as transgender (Hervey, 2018). As
regards Hungary, Orbán’s anti-migration stance is well-
known, and just two months before the Court’s ruling,
the Hungarian Parliament voted in favour of a bill that
outlaws Legal Gender Recognition for transgender peo-
ple (Transgender Europe, 2020).
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Table 2. Votes in cases concerning transgender issues, 2011–2020.
Country scores Country scores
of judges voting of judges voting
Case #, Vote aligned with state aligned w/trans
Case Topic Year and result policies Average contestation Average
P v. Portugal Legal 56027/09, Strike-out (domestic law had changed in the meantime)
recognition 2011
Halat v. Ill- 23607/08, 5-2 state Ser, Tur* 4; Ice, 5.40 It 4; Bel 7 5.50
Turkey treatment 2011 Swi 5; Port 9
Cassar v. Marriage 36982/11, Strike-out (domestic law had changed in the meantime)
Malta 2013
Hämäläinen Marriage 37359/09, 14-3 state And, B&H, Mon 0; 3.43 Swi 5; Hu 8; Bel 10 7.66
v. Finland 2014 Lcht, Lit 1; Azer 2;
It, Lat 4; Fin*, Lux 5;
Fr, Gr, Mold 6; No 8
YY v. Turkey Sterilisation 14793/08, 7-0 trans Lit 2; It, Tur* 3; 5.29
2015 Swi 4; Mont 6;
Ice 9; Bel 10
X v. Turkey Medical 24727/12, Inadmissible (domestic remedies not exhausted)
errors 2017
D.Ç. v. Surgery 10684/13, Inadmissible (domestic remedies not exhausted)
Turkey 2017
A.P., Garcon Sterilising 79885/12, 6-1 trans Lcht 1 1.00 Azer 2; Bul 3; 6.0
& Nicot v. treatment 2017 B&H, Lat 5;
France Ger 10, Fr* 11
S.V. v. Italy Legal 55216/08, 7-0 trans SanM 0; Arm 1; 6.0
recog. 2018 Cz 4; It* 6; Cro 9;
Fin 10; Gr 12
X v. FYROM Legal 29683/16, 5-2 trans Cz 4; Po 5 4.50 SMar 0; Mac* 1; 6.2
recog. 2019 UK 8; Fin 10; Gr 12
PO v. Russia Legal 52516/13, Strike-out (Court has received no response to its letter)
recog. 2019
P v. Ukraine Legal 40296/16, Inadm. Geor, Lat 4; Ukr* 6; 7.86
recog. 2019 state Au, Ire 9; Ger 10;
Fr 13
Solmaz v. Ill- 49373/17, Inadm. Mont 5; Est 8; 8.00
Turkey treatment 2019 state No 11
RL v. Russia Legal 36253/13, Strike-out (Court has received no response to its letter)
recog. 2020
YT v. Legal 41701/16, 7-0 trans Azer, Bulg* 0; Lat 3; 4.43
Bulgaria recog. 2020 Geo 4; Ukr 5; Ire 9;
Ger 10
Rana v. Legal 40888/17, 3-0 trans Lcht 1; Hu* 2; 2.33
Hungary recog. 2020 Ser 4
migrant
Average 5.03 5.43
Notes: * National judges.
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Table 3. Voting behaviour of national judges.
Decision national judge aligned Decision national judge aligned
with state policies with trans contestation
Decision court aligned with state policies 14 0
Decision court aligned with trans contestation 1 12
In sum, the dominant pattern is not one of judges de-
fending their government, but of national judges joining
the majority. This pattern confirms Voeten’s finding that
‘judges have a strong and significant preference for not
being lone dissenters’ (2008, p. 428) and seems to hint
at the strong impact of socialisation processes.
4.3. Processes of Persuasion
Looking at Table 1, the Court’s decision in Goodwin
v. UK (2002) on legal gender recognition clearly con-
stituted a breakthrough. In previous cases, the Court
had supported the British government, but in Goodwin
v. UK (2002) it decided that transgender human rights
were being violated. One could argue that Nicolas Bratza,
the British judge, had finally been persuaded by his
colleagues and voted accordingly. Yet, one could also
argue that judge Bratza brought his profile as human
rights lawyer to Strasbourg, as opposed to his predeces-
sor Freeland, who spent decades in British diplomatic
service. In some other cases, the judges’ professional
or political background also better explains their vote
than their home country’s score (see also Arold, 2007b;
Voeten, 2008, p. 431). Judge De Meyer, for instance,
also acted as adviser to the Belgian Christian-Democrats,
which seems in line with his distinctly conservative views
(Sheffield and Horsham v. UK, 1998, p. 23; XYZ v. UK,
1997, p. 19).
In many cases, separate opinions reflect the frustra-
tions of judges who were unable to convince the major-
ity. These do not describe much in the way of persua-
sion, even literally: In Cossey v. UK (1990), the judges
who had previously dissented in Rees v. UK (1986) de-
clared themselves “no more persuaded now than we
were then” (Cossey v. UK, 1990, p. 16). In a lengthy dis-
senting opinion in Cossey v. UK (1990), Judge Martens
tried to persuade his colleagues that the court had been
wrong in Rees v. UK (1986) and should review its decision.
In the next trans case, B v. France (1992), Martens was
pleased to note that “several of my colleagues now share
that opinion” (p. 47). Six judges indeed had changed
their views frompro-state to pro-trans, but three of them
would vote pro-state again in the subsequent case, so it
cannot be confirmed that they really shared his opinion.
Zooming in on arguments instead of judges, we can
see how discourses are in the end dominated by wide
interpretations rather than narrow ones. The focus is
on four recurring issues: the margin of appreciation,
the knowledgeable individual, transgender bodies, and
transgender relations.
4.4. The Margin of Appreciation
The legal argument of a ‘margin of appreciation’
awarded to governments, especially in politicised is-
sues, plays a key role in all cases. If judges behave as
European norm setters, they should strongly dispute
claims supporting a wide margin of appreciation. In
Cossey v. UK (1990), Macdonald and Spielman protest
that “although the principle of the States’ wide margin
of appreciation was at a pinch acceptable in the Rees
v. UK (1986) case, this is no longer true today” (p. 17).
Eight years later, the dissent was even more outspoken.
In vain, judges protested that British law was out of sync
with societal developments, and that states’ margin of
appreciation could not justify “policies which lead in-
evitably to embarrassing and hurtful intrusions into the
private lives of such [transgender] persons” (Sheffield
and Horsham v. UK, 1998, p. 29). Other judges vehe-
mently opposed anywidening in transgender cases, argu-
ing that: “Situations which depart from the normal and
natural order of things must not give rise to aberrations
in the field of fundamental rights” (judges De Meyer,
Valticos and Morenilla in Sheffield and Horsham v. UK,
1998, p. 23). In Goodwin v. UK (2002), four years later,
the Court stated unanimously that:
In the twenty-first century the right of transsexuals to
personal development and to physical andmoral secu-
rity in the full sense enjoyed by others in society could
no longer be regarded as a matter of controversy re-
quiring the lapse of time to cast clearer light on the
issues involved. (p. 26)
Clearly, the Strasbourg legal community had lost its pa-
tience with the British government and finally defined
a European standard, which laggards had to comply
with too.
Opinions diverged as to the meaning of the margin
of appreciation itself. While (pro-state) judge Morenilla
already defined a positive obligation as a form of widen-
ing, (pro-trans) judge Martens wanted to narrow the
margin of appreciation to the states’ decision of how
to implement a Court ruling instead of the Court’s deci-
sion on the matter at hand (Cossey v. UK, 1990, p. 23).
And while judge Pinheiro Farinha argued that the Court
does not have the right to grant new rights to individu-
als (B v. France, 1992, p. 30), judge Martens defended
the opposite position and argued that the Court should
develop new common standards precisely because:
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In such a larger, diversified community the develop-
ment of common standards may well prove the best,
if not the only way of achieving the Court’s professed
aim of ensuring that the Convention remains a living
instrument to be interpreted so as to reflect societal
changes and to remain in line with present-day condi-
tions. (Cossey v. UK, 1990, p. 24)
The question continues to resurface. Most recently, in
2019, judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek protested that “the
letter of the Convention is the impassable frontier”
and that it “is incompatible with the mandate of a ju-
dicial body to trigger or amplify societal changes by
way of an ‘evolutive interpretation’ of the Convention”
(X v. FYROM, 2019, p. 19). Interestingly, this narrow view
has become the minority view (2–5 votes). Over time,
the living-instrument approach seems to have side-lined
the margin of appreciation in transgender cases on le-
gal recognition.
4.5. The Knowledgeable Individual
While the European Convention aims to protect the in-
dividual against the state, the individual tends to be nar-
rowly defined as the knowledgeable, responsible individ-
ual, and for a long time the Court excluded transgen-
der persons from that category. They were deemed in-
capable of assessing the consequences of their actions,
undergoing irreversible surgical interventions without
due reflection. Judge Matscher contended that the ini-
tiative to have an operation outside France was taken
“lightly, as it seems” (B v. France, 1992, p. 29), and judge
Pinheiro Farinha feared “the trivialisation of irreversible
surgical operations” (B v. France, 1992, p. 30). The Court
treated them with compassion as a “small and tragic
group of fellow-men” (Martens, as cited in Cossey v. UK,
1990, p. 19), “deserving as they are of the Court’s sympa-
thy” (Freeland, as cited in Sheffield and Horsham v. UK,
1998, p. 25).
In contrast, the judges’ language suggests they know
exactly what transgender people should do: Judge Pettiti
warns that ‘many cases of true or false transsexual ap-
plicants correspond to psychiatric states which should
be treated by psychiatry only, so as not to risk disaster’
(B v. France, 1992, p. 34). Judges also seem to know best
how a trans person should feel: “Like any other human
being, a transsexualmust come to termswith his past. He
has no need to be ashamed of having wanted to change
sex” (DeMeyer, Valticos, &Morenilla, as cited in Sheffield
and Horsham v. UK, 1998, p. 24); “[applicant should have
waited before undergoing surgery] The suffering and feel-
ings of frustration caused by a further delay of sixmonths
cannot therefore be regarded as unbearable” (Vajić and
Jebens, as cited in Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, p. 31);
“It is not shown that her family life within the meaning
of Article 8 would be somehow affected by her change
of gender (Ziemele, as cited in Hämäläinen v. Finland,
2014, p. 29).
The transgender individual is, hence, an individual in
need of the protection of someone who knows what is
better for them. To convince their colleagues, ‘pro-trans’
judges also resort to medical arguments, stating that
trans people suffer from gender dysphoria as a recog-
nisedmedical condition. They also refer to the autonomy
of a transgender person in almost standardised word-
ing in several cases (e.g., Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009,
§100; Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, §69; YY v. Turkey, 2015,
§58), but without daring to argue for self-determination
in the sense that a person defines their gender iden-
tity themselves. Only this step would undo the narrow-
ing of the transgender individual as unknowledgeable
and irresponsible.
4.6. Transgender Bodies
The European Convention does not refer to men or
women, but to ‘everyone’ or ‘anyone,’ with the excep-
tion of Article 12 on marriage. ‘Everyone’ should be pro-
tected against sex discrimination, but the Convention
ignores that ‘everyone’ and ‘anyone’ are gendered be-
ings. Every transgender case thus requires widening the
Convention’s provisions, as the Convention ‘does not
guarantee the right to change sex’ (Pinheiro Farinha, as
cited in B v. France, 1992, p. 30). Yet, there is more
to it than widening. Judges struggle to come to terms
with the transgender body and their notion of what is
a woman/man:
Biologically she is considered not to be a woman. But
neither is she a man, after the medical treatment
and surgery. She falls somewhere between the sexes.
(Palm, as cited in Cossey v. UK, 1990, p. 5)
A sex change does not result in the acquisition of all
the biological characteristics of the other sex. While
it removes the organs and functions specific to the
‘former sex,’ it creates, at most, only the appearance
of the ‘new sex.’ (De Meyer, Valticos, & Morenilla, as
cited in Sheffield and Horsham v. UK, 1998, p. 24)
Surgical operations do not change the individual’s real
[sic] sex, but only the outward signs and morphology
of sex. (Pinheiro Farinha, as cited in B v. France, 1992,
p. 30)
Judge Pinheiro Farinha bluntly states: “I do not know the
concept of social sex and I do not recognise the right of
a person to change sex at will” (B v. France, 1992, p. 30).
And judges De Meyer, Valticos, and Morenilla maintain
the opinion that any legal recognition of sex change is a
falsification and amounts to “permitting a husband who
has gone to live with another woman to demand that his
wife’s name on his marriage certificate be replaced by
that of his new partner” (Sheffield and Horsham v. UK,
1998, p. 23). The Court sticks to biological determinism
instead of considering sex a legal category, such as ‘fam-
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ily’ or ‘property,’ which it can give an autonomous legal
meaning (Gonzalez-Salzberg, 2014, p. 807): “The appli-
cant whom I will not refer to in the feminine, [because]
even after the hormone treatment and surgical opera-
tion which he underwent, [he] continued to show the
characteristics of a person ofmale sex” (Pinheiro Farinha,
as cited in B v. France, 1992, p. 30).
The Court only defends the right to legal gender
recognition (after Goodwin v. UK, 2002) for individu-
als who have completed gender reassignment, includ-
ing genital surgery. Pre-operative transgender persons
are referred to “as being in an ‘intermediate’ position”
(Gonzalez-Salzberg, 2014, p. 825). Some judges even
openly display discomfort with non-binary bodies: “One
cannot accept dubious hermaphrodites and ambiguous
situations….And is there thus not a risk…of seeing as a
consequence half-feminised men claiming the right to
marry normally constituted men, and then where would
the line to be drawn?” (Valticos & Loizou, as cited in
B v. France, 1992, p. 37).
The requirement of permanent sterilisation for trans-
gender persons as a prior condition for legal gen-
der recognition remains highly contested and is still
enforced in 20 member states (Transgender Europe,
2019). In Turkey, permanent sterilisation is even re-
quired before getting access to gender reassignment
surgery. Dissenting judges in YY v. Turkey (2015) ques-
tion whether states have “a legitimate interest capable
of justifying the requirement of permanent infertility”;
theymake a comparisonwith the Court’s earlier condem-
nation of the forced sterilisation of women of Roma ori-
gin, and would have preferred the Court to widen the
application of Article 8 and decide whether the require-
ment of permanent sterilisation as such is a violation
(YY v. Turkey, 2015, pp. 24–26). In 2017, in A.P., Garcon,
& Nicot v. France (2017), the Court finally condemned
sterilisation as a required prior condition. However, it still
failed to answer the question ofwhich legitimate interest
states could have to impose sterilisation on transgender
bodies, leaving some judges dissatisfied (A.P., Garcon, &
Nicot v. France, 2017, pp. 52–59). In sum, the Court has
not come up with a purely legal definition of the trans
body, preferring to hide behind the medical profession’s
opinion. This also implies that non-binary bodies fail to
be protected by Court reasoning.
4.7. Marriage and Family
According to Article 12, ‘Men and women of marriage-
able age have the right to marry and to found a fam-
ily, according to the national laws governing the exer-
cise of this right’ (European Court of Human Rights, 2013,
p. 13). It logically follows from the refusal to recognise
sex change that trans persons are not allowed to marry,
since the Convention’s definition of marriage implies the
union of a man and a woman (Cossey v. UK, 1990, p. 7).
Added to that,many states requiremarried trans persons
to divorce first if they want to have their gender reassign-
ment legally recognised. The Court continues to adhere
to its heteronormative views (Johnson, 2018).
Already in 1990, dissenting judges asked in vain to
widen the concept of marriage, arguing that the drafts-
men of the European Convention had traditional mar-
riage in mind, but not the intention to deny transsexu-
als the right to marry (Cossey v. UK, 1990, pp. 27–28).
However, the Court does not question the historical and
geographic specificity of the concept of marriage (see
Kollman & Waites, 2009). Marriage is defended as “an
area of life in which the biological sex of a person is of
supreme vital importance” and is “universally accepted
throughout human history” (B v. France, 1992, p. 44).
In two cases in 2006, the Court referred approvingly to
a British court decision which stipulated that “marriage
could only be between a woman and a man, determined
on genital, gonadal and chromosomal factors, and should
not take into account the party’s psychological beliefs”
(Parry v. UK, 2006, p. 5; R&F v. UK, 2006, p. 5). The
Court admits that this requirement clearly puts F. ‘in a
quandary—she must, invidiously, sacrifice her gender or
her marriage’ (R&F v. UK, 2006, p. 12; same sentence in
Parry v. UK, 2006, p. 10) but considered this proportion-
ate. Eight years later, in Hämäläinen v. Finland (2014),
dissenting judges asked in vain to widen the meaning of
Article 12 to the right ‘to remain married’; they argue
that ‘it is an oversimplification’ to treat the relationship
between a transwoman and herwife as a homosexual re-
lationship (p. 38). The Court, however, sticks to the opin-
ion that states have a legitimate interest in protecting tra-
ditional marriage. Today, 26 of the 47member states still
require a transgender person to divorce in order to ob-
tain legal gender recognition (ILGA-Europe, 2020).
Similarly to marriage, the concept of family in
Article 8 on the respect for private and family life is not
elaborated in the Convention, but judges systematically
narrow it to a constellation of woman as mother, man
as father, and their biological children. As judge Walsh
stated: “It would be the height of absurdity to describe a
father as having become his own child’s mother or aunt
as it would be to describe amother as having becomeher
own child’s father or uncle” (B v. France, 1992, p. 44).
Judge De Meyer claimed that “it is self-evident that
a person who is manifestly not the father of a child has
no right to be recognised as her father,” and there “is
only ‘the appearances’ of ‘family ties’ between transman
X and child Z” (XYZ v. UK, 1997, p. 19). Judge Petitti
even claimed that “not all transsexuals have the same
aptitude for family life as a non-transsexual” (XYZ v. UK,
1997, p. 17), and to substantiate the claim, he refers to a
popular-scientific publication written by himself (Pettiti,
1992). In vain, judges Gotchev and Makarczyk argued
that this is family life and should be recognised as such
(XYZ v. UK, 1997, p. 26). Another dissenter asked to
widen the concept using the analogy of the father as
“the partner of a mother who gives birth to a child as
a result of AID [artificial insemination by donor]” (Thór
Vilhjámsson, as cited in XYZ v. UK, 1997, p. 23). In trans-
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gender cases, judges have narrowed, not widened the
concept of family.
5. Conclusions
Transgender rights remain a highly contested issue,
upsetting the ‘normal,’ binary ordering of society.
Transphobia and hate speech are on the rise in Europe.
To find out to what extent the Court in Strasbourg acts
as a guardian of trans human rights and bolsters progres-
sive European norms, and to what extent it refrains from
criticising governments who do not respect trans rights,
I formulated expectations based on rational institutional-
ism regarding the extent towhich judgeswill vote accord-
ing to the state of trans rights in their home country; and
based on sociological institutionalism regarding widen-
ing norms in the socialising environment of the Court.
Analysing all trans cases (1980–2020), I did not find
a correlation between judges’ votes and the situation
of trans rights in their country. For 10 cases since 2011,
Court Chambers giving a pro-trans ruling had a slightly
higher average country score than Chambers giving a pro-
state ruling. That said, at the individual level this correla-
tion did not hold, as judges from low-scoring countries,
including (South-)Eastern European ones, sometimes
support trans rights, while judges from high-scoring
countries, includingWestern European ones, sometimes
defend the state. With one exception, ‘national’ judges
never defended their home country against the view
of a majority. They joined the majority, whether pro-
state or pro-trans. In sum, rationalist expectations were
not confirmed.
An analysis of the separate opinions showed that,
over time, widening and narrowing processes have taken
place regarding several aspects of transgender cases.
Importantly, the margin of appreciation was narrowed
over time, reducing the space for conservative govern-
ments to deal with transgender issues the way they see
fit. However, the Court continues to struggle to acknowl-
edge the transgender individual as being autonomous,
knowledgeable and responsible, and still has not ac-
knowledged their right to self-determination. Norms con-
cerning the transgender body have been widened over
time, but remain within the limits of binary, medical
thinking. An exception to patterns of gradual widening
is the Court’s persistently narrow definition of marriage
and family. Given the very piecemeal, incomplete and
hesitant widening processes, sociological institutional-
ist expectations have been met to the extent that the
Court indeed seems a site of socialisation, albeit one
unable overcome the strong convictions judges bring
to Strasbourg.
What do these findings imply for pending cases
involving countries such as Georgia, Romania, Russia
and Turkey, where trans people are very vulnerable
and governments seem receptive to transphobic be-
liefs? As judges have not given in to a backlash in their
home and other countries, and as widening has resulted
in a stable body of pro-trans judgments, my findings
point at some European norm setting, which might be
good news for the transgender community. On the dark
side, for populist and conservative supporters of state
sovereignty, the margin of appreciation’s side-lining in
transgender cases confirms their criticisms of the Court,
which might endanger its legitimacy and, hence, its long-
term effectiveness.
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